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Abstract: Like any reciprocal relationship, representation is filled with expectations. Different types 
of voters have different types of ideas on how elected politicians should behave in their role as 
representatives and what should be considered to be the primary focus of representation. On the other 
hand, candidates running for elections or MPs already familiar with real-life decision-making 
situations have their own perceptions. The extent to which these preferences match with each other, in 
turn, is pivotal for the process legitimacy of representative democracies. In this review chapter, we 
first discuss the congruence in representational preferences from a conceptual and methodological 
perspective: how can whether voters and politicians have overlapping expectations of representational 
roles be measured, and what does congruence mean in the context of representational preferences. 
Second, we review the findings of those relatively few previous analyses that have examined the 
question of whether voters and elected representatives have congruent preferences for the style and 
focus of representation. Third, we address the implications of voter-elite congruence for citizens’ 
satisfaction with the performance of democratic regimes. This is followed by a concluding section, 
which looks ahead and asks: What can be expected from future studies of congruence in 
representational expectations and preferences? 
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Political representation is ultimately based on a reciprocal relationship between a principal and an 
agent (Urbinati and Warren 2008, p. 398). Like in any relationship, both parties have expectations 
concerning its shape and substance. The extent to which these expectations overlap or diverge 
influences the perceived functionality of the relationship. In the case of political representation which 
takes place within elected institutions, the principal-agent relationship is formalized in legislation 
(Castiglione and Warren 2019, p. 22). This further means that implications of well- or poorly 
functioning relationship are even wider, extending to the overall satisfaction with representational 
democracy. If elected representatives continuously make claims concerning their representational 
roles which are not acknowledged or accepted by their constituencies (cf. Saward 2010, p. 36), the 
legitimacy of the entire democratic process will eventually suffer. Another layer of complexity stems 
from the dynamic character of political representation (cf. Dalton et al. 2011, p. 24): representational 
preferences are not stable but transform themselves depending on policy issues at hand and the 
context of the decision-making practices. In a nutshell, political representation is an ongoing 
endeavor, ‘constituted not simply by the self-understanding of the representative, but also the 
expectations of the represented’ (Castiglione and Warren 2019, p. 35). 
 
To make things even more complicated, there are multiple ways to understand even constitutionally 
defined representational roles (see Mansbridge 2003). Voters have different ideas on how elected 
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politicians should behave in their role as representatives and what should be considered to be the 
primary focus of representation. MPs already familiar with real-life decision-making situations might 
have other kinds of preference. Candidates running for election could lie somewhere in between. Its 
multifaceted essence makes the empirical study of representational preferences and expectations a 
highly demanding yet ever more vital task. Furthermore, as there are multiple ways to measure 
congruence (see Golder and Stramski 2010), and the satisfactory level of congruence is subjected to 
discretion, the functionality of representational relationship is difficult to evaluate precisely. 
 
In this article, we bound three strains of the literature together. First, the congruence in 
representational preferences is discussed from a conceptual and methodological perspective: how can 
it be measured whether voters and politicians have overlapping expectations about representational 
roles, and what does congruence mean in the context of representational preferences? Second, we 
reviewed the findings of those relatively few analyses that have examined the question of whether 
voters and elected representatives have congruent preferences for the process of representation, that 
is, the way elected representatives should carry out their work. Third, we consider congruence in 
representational expectations from the perspective of satisfaction with democracy: should we expect 
a positive or negative link between congruence and satisfaction, and why? The concluding section 
addresses the question posed in the title from a scholarly perspective: What can be expected in future 
studies of congruence in representational expectations and preferences?  
 
<a> Congruence in preferences for representation: conceptual and methodological framework 
 
The first challenge in any study of representational preferences is to define what is meant by 
representative role(s). As Castiglione and Warren (2019, p. 35) remark, even formal roles like those 
of MPs’ are ‘typically subject to conflicting expectations, with many possible ways to understand 
duties and responsibilities’. As a point of departure, a distinction needs to made between normative 
roles, deriving from democratic theory (e.g., Ankersmit 2002; Dovi 2007; Mansbridge 2003; Pitkin 
1967), and more pragmatic task definitions and work performances (e.g., Esaiasson 2000). 
 
In theoretical accounts, the focus of representation is usually differentiated from the style of 
representation (Eulau et al. 1959, p. 744), treating these two as separate, although closely related 
fields. Focus can be further classified into several subcategories, such as national representation of 
all citizens, geographical representation of one’s own constituency, party representation and interest 
representation of various religious, social, economic and ideological groups (see, e.g., Brack et al. 
2012; Eulau and Karps 1977, p. 248; von Schoultz and Wass 2016, p. 139–40). The style of 
representation, in turn, refers to classic controversy between the delegate and trustee models. This 
was first formulated by Edmund Burke in 1774 is his famous speech in Bristol:  
 
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which 
interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and 
advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, 
that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but 
the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole (see Kurland and 
Lerner 1987, p. 448).  
 
However, as most constitutions define members of parliament as independent actors bound only by 
their own conscience, this distinction is often considered to be redundant in the empirical study of 




In a similar fashion, it has been pointed out that theory-driven empirical analysis of MPs’ 
representational roles can easily be criticized as an abstract academic exercise which is untouched by 
the reality of a political process characterized by strong political parties (Carman 2006, p. 104, for 
defence, see also Carman 2007). As major theories of political representation were formulated prior 
to the formation of modern parties (Thomassen 1994, p. 250), they tend to emphasize a dyadic 
relationship between the principal and the agent at the expense of collective representation. In 
contrast, the model of party representation describes a practice of representation rather than forming 
a theory by itself (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008; Judge 1999, p. 71). With the extension of suffrage 
and the increasing role of parties in elections especially in closed-list PR systems, MPs became more 
coordinated in their decision-making and parties gradually began to control the entire process of 
representation (Méndez-Lago and Martínez 2002). This is reflected in recent empirical studies 
concentrating solely on the preferences for modes of party representation, such as partisans, delegates 
or trustees (Önnudóttir 2016) or promise-keeping, responsiveness to public opinion and enacting the 
common good (Werner 2019), and government representation (Bowler 2017). 
 
<b> How can congruence in representational preferences be measured?  
  
As every topic in empirical social science research, measuring congruence between citizens’ and 
MPs’ representational preferences is subjected to often tricky methodological considerations. Many 
relevant methodological topics related to studying policy congruence, i.e. issue agreement, between 
voters and representatives are covered in the chapter by Louwerse and Andeweg (2020) included in 
this volume. Here, we will thus focus more on the specific question related to measuring non-policy 
congruence. Much like the research on policy congruence, studies of voter-MP congruence rely on 
surveys conducted among representatives and the public with identical question(s). The opinions on 
the side of voter(s) and representative(s) are then compared against each other (as has been done by 
Campbell and Lovenduski 2015; Méndez-Lago and Martínez 2002; von Schoultz and Wass 2016). 
The comparison is relatively straightforward if an opinion of a voter from one constituency is directly 
linked to their elected representative in a single member district (Hurley 1982; Weissberg 1978). 
However, the situation becomes more complicated once representatives are perceived as a collective 
body (Andeweg 2011; Pitkin 1967: 168–225; Weissberg 1978) which is then scrutinized vis-à-vis the 
collective opinion of citizens. In that case, it is no longer an individual MP, but a political party, a 
group of policymakers or an entire assembly whose perception of representation should be matched 
to voters’ expectations. Neither is it possible to measure congruence without aggregating the 
preferences of both groups.  
 
The prevailing methodological approach to determine voter-representative congruence is to measure 
the distance between the opinion of the median citizen and the median representative. Such 
congruence can be measured either in absolute or relative terms (Golder and Stramski 2010). Whereas 
with the former one subtracts the opinion of the median citizen from the opinion of the median 
representative on a pre-defined ideational dimension, the latter also considers the dispersion in the 
opinions of citizens, representatives, or both, along the ideational dimension. Although both 
approaches are fully legitimate depending on the theoretical framework and research problem at hand, 
Golder and Stramski (2010, p. 90) argue that ‘a concept of relative congruence is typically more 
appropriate for scholars interested in evaluating how well representatives are performing at producing 
congruence than the more common concept of absolute congruence’. 
 
While survey data allow either a simple comparison between representational preferences among 
voters and representatives or a methodologically more sophisticated analysis of congruence, they 
come with several limitations. First, survey data are not always sufficiently detailed to test all aspects 
of representational theory. For instance, Weissberg’s seminal piece (1978) distinguishes between 
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dyadic and collective representation. The former posits that representatives act on behalf of their 
specific constituencies whereas the latter perceives MPs as a collective body representing society as 
a whole (Andeweg 2011; Hurley 1982; Miller and Stokes 1963; Pitkin 1967,  p. 168–225). Even 
though there are plausible arguments on why either one should prevail, survey data are too hazy and 
social reality too dynamic to clearly disentangle which approach is dominant among citizens and 
representatives (cf. Reher 2016, p. 45).  
 
Second, formulating questions on representational preferences is a highly demanding task as citizens 
and political elites might not understand the concepts in an identical manner. In order to avoid 
ambiguity, representational roles need to be described as relatively simple either-or ideal types at the 
expense of nuances, which are often essential in complex decision-making situations in which 
representatives hold several roles simultaneously (see e.g., Bengtsson and Wass 2011; Bowler 2017; 
Carman 2006). This is particularly the case with the style of representation, which is more difficult 
to measure than the focus of representation. Studies of representational styles usually boil down to a 
distinction between mandate and independency. Werner (2019) distinguishes between (1) promise 
keeping – representatives act in accordance with their election pledges, (2) responsiveness to public 
opinion – representatives reflect the current opinion of their voters, and (3) enacting the common 
good – representatives act in the interest of the common good. In a corresponding manner, 
Dassonneville et al. (2020) make a distinction between preferences for MPs (1) to do what they 
promised during the election campaign (promissory mandate), (2) to act in line with the preferences 
of the majority of citizens in their constituency (opinion mandate), and (3) to follow their own 
conscience (trustee mandate). An attempt to measure preferences for these options soon runs into 
methodological obstacles. If each of them is assessed separately, respondents, i.e. voters and 
representatives alike, may rate all three as being equally important (cf. Bengtsson and Wass 2011). If 
respondents are requested to rate the representational styles in pairs, none of them might found to be 
predominant (Bengtsson and Wass 2011; Bowler 2017; Carman 2006). In order to tackle this 
limitation, Werner (2019) developed a methodologically innovative approach combining both these 
approaches by asking respondents first to rate each option separately and then in pairs. In addition, 
her research design employed an original survey experiment which confronted respondents with a 
situational vignette to disentangle the preferences and identify the primary one. This approach is 
certainly a step towards tackling the representational preferences according to their relevance in a 
reliable way. However, given the demands placed on respondents in completing an extensive 
questionnaire it is questionable how successful such a method would be to measure MPs’ preferences 
in order to compare them with citizens. 
 
Finally, it can be contested whether representatives and citizens are even addressing the same 
phenomenon when indicating their representational preferences. Voters’ preferences might be biased 
due to their modest understanding of the institutional constraints under which MPs operate (Campbell 
and Lovenduski 2015, p. 694) whereas MPs can be so constrained by practical realities that they 
perceive representational models as being abstract and redundant. Hence, we easily end up setting 
voters’ ideals against MPs’ task descriptions (cf. Esaiasson 2000). The other possible source of 
ambiguity is the character of preferences since it seldom becomes evident whether both voters and 
MPs are revealing egotropic or sociotropic preferences. It could easily be the case that former mostly 
consider representation from the point of view of an individual citizen while the latter think of wider 
implications for representative democracy or other way around. This further means that interpreting 
the results of empirical studies of conguence in representational preferences is more complex than 
when assessing issue congruence between voters and their representatives.  
 
 




Despite methodological issues, we need to address the ultimate question: what does the high or low 
level of voter-MP congruence in representational preferences actually mean? (See von Schoultz and 
Wass 2016, p. 154–5). Because role preferences and real-life decision-making situations are two 
separate matters, congruence in preferences as such cannot be taken as an implication that the actions 
of MPs are necessarily in line with the expectations of voters. It merely indicates that both have 
similar normative concepts of representation. More objective measures of the behavior of MPs 
include such things as analyses of deliberations within parliamentary standing committees, rollcall 
voting or plenum speeches. MPs’ preferences might also be sensitive to social desirability bias, 
mostly echoing the assumed expectations of voters for local representation or frustration with party-
orientated representation. Finally, even a high degree of voter-MP congruence in representational 
preferences does not guarantee anything simply because when it comes to their legislative voting, 
representatives obey the instructions issued by their parties in most instances (von Schoultz and Wass 
2016, p. 155). These are the key issues to bear in mind when discussing empirical findings in the 
field.  
  
While there is substantial literature on MPs’ perceptions of their parliamentary roles (for review, see 
Andeweg 2012; Brack et al. 2016) and a growing number of studies examining voters’ expectations 
(André et al. 2010; Bengtsson and Wass 2010, 2011; Carman 2006, 2007; Dassonneville et al. 2020; 
Davidson 1970; Doherty 2013; Kornberg et al. 1980; McMurray and Parsons 1965; Patterson et al. 
1975; Werner 2019), only a handful of analyses have focused on congruence between the two. 
Following the seminal Canadian study by Kornberg et al. (1980), Holmberg (1989) noticed that the 
members of the Swedish parliament and voters clearly diverged in relation to their views on preferred 
roles of the representatives. Whereas the role of party loyalists was prioritized by MPs (51%) from 
three options available, only 14 percent of voters shared the same preference. For voters, the delegate 
role was the definite top preference, preferred by 56 percent, but only by 15 percent of MPs. However, 
both groups saw eye to eye about the role of an independent trustee, preferred by around 30 percent. 
  
Over a decade later, Méndez-Lago and Martínez (2002) found a considerable congruence gap based 
on surveys conducted separately among Spanish MPs and voters in 1997. The discrepancy in 
representational preferences was most pronounced in relation to the geographical focus: 42 percent 
of MPs perceived that legislators should represent all the nation’s citizens while only 28 percent 
considered all voters in their constituency to be the primary focus. Less than five percent preferred 
constituency-centered representation, while support for national representation was almost equally 
large among citizens. Furthermore, less than ten percent of Spanish MPs prioritized their party as a 
representational focus as opposed to around 25 percent of the voters. In turn, MP-voter congruence 
in functionally defined representation of specific interest groups appeared to be quite high: among 
both groups only a few percent regarded a specific social group to be the most important focus of 
representation.  
  
It took another decade until the next study, which was conducted in the context of UK single-member 
constituencies (Campbell and Lovenduski 2015). It revealed the level of MP-voter congruence in the 
preference for representational roles to be much higher than the authors initially expected. From a 
pre-defined list, both groups prioritized constituency-orientated activities, although such an emphasis 
was slightly more popular among voters than among MPs. Party-orientated activities, such as 
supporting MP’s party in parliament and taking part in parliamentary debates were both ranked first 
by under less than five percent among MPs and voters. The authors, however, recommended treating 
the results with caution as they do not necessarily travel across electoral systems (see Campbell and 
Lovenduski 2015, p. 705). In addition, the fact that all MPs included in the survey were backbenchers 




In their investigation of the Finnish open-list proportional representation (PR) system with mandatory 
preferential voting, von Schoultz and Wass (2016) matched two surveys including identical questions 
concerning the focus of representation posed to voters and candidates. The most popular focus among 
both groups turned out to be the national perspective, reflecting the constitutional principle of citizen 
representation, while constituency-orientated representation was the second most popular alternative. 
Party, in turn, seemed to be downplayed in the Finnish context with a surprisingly low eight percent 
of candidates considering it to be their primary focus. Representation of specific interest groups was 
the least popular alternative, which only a marginal proportion of candidates and voters regarded as 
the priority. Based on the overall ranking of the different foci made by candidates and voters, the 
authors also calculated many-to-many congruence using a measure developed by Golder and 
Stramski (2010). On average, the distribution of preferences for each of the four representational foci 
was strikingly similar between voters and candidates. The highest level of congruence, close to an 
identical preference distribution (ranking), was found for the party focus. The lowest, although still 
notable, level of congruence concerned the constituency perspective.  
  
While it is impossible to draw strong conclusions from a handful of studies conducted in different 
electoral systems at different times, some observations seem obvious. First, party-focused 
representation has low ranking, be it assessed by voters or political elites. This certainly makes sense 
in open-list systems, such as Finland, where around 40 percent of voters consider candidates to be 
more important for their vote choice than the party (Isotalo et al. 2019, p. 16). It might also reflect 
the desire of representatives to have more room for maneuver from the party whip. Second, 
particularly the results from Finnish and the UK indicate a reasonable match between citizens and 
political elites in terms of their representational preferences. The size of this match is somewhat 
higher especially when contrasted with the level of voter-MP congruence on some policy issues. 
Whereas studies of issue agreement have detected a high correspondence between parties and voters 
on issues closely related to the left-right dimension (Dingler et al. 2019; Dolný and Baboš 2015; 
Reher 2018), noticeable discrepancies have previously been observed concerning EU and 
immigration (e.g., Lefkofridi and Horvath 2012; Mattila and Raunio 2012). Finally, it is unclear what 
voter-MP congruence in representational preferences ultimately means, and what implications it 
could potentially have. This is what we turn to next. 
 
 
<a> A link between voter-MP congruence in representational preferences and satisfaction with 
democracy  
 
Despite the difference between voter-MP congruence in representational preferences and the actual 
congruence in voters’ expectations and MPs’ real-life actions, there are reasons to assume that even 
the former can influence the legitimacy of the representational process. A recent study by Arnesen 
and Peters (2018), based on survey experiments, suggests that citizens are more willing to accept 
political decisions when they are made in line with descriptive representation, namely by a group of 
people like them. It thus seems reasonable to assume that the same logic would apply to 
representational roles: once the outcome of the policy-making process has been pursued (even if not 
necessarily reached in a fashion that corresponds citizens’ representational expectations), it appears 
to be more legitimate. From that perspective, voter-MP congruence in representational preferences 
can be seen as being one component of the perceived responsiveness which affects decision 
acceptance among citizens (cf. Esaiasson et al. 2017). 
 
An even bigger question relates to the extent to which citizens’ satisfaction with the representational 
processes influences their overall satisfaction with democracy. In fact, there is evidence that if MPs 
fulfil their representative roles in line with citizens’ expectations, people are increasingly likely to be 
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satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Blais et al. 
2017; Brunell and Buchler 2009; Dahlberg et al. 2015; Ruiz-Rufino 2013). The link also works the 
other way around:  a failure to meet citizens’ expectations leads to disappointment which may damage 
the legitimacy of the entire democratic regime (Bowler and Karp 2004; Vivyan and Wagner 2016). 
 
Could voter-MP congruence in representational preferences thus be used as an indicator of citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy? It is generally argued that citizens are happier about the quality of 
representation when they perceive their preferences being promoted by policy-makers (Anderson et 
al. 2005; Miller 1974). This usually happens in the systems with a high degree of ideological 
congruence between citizens and their elected representatives (Curini et al. 2012; Dahlberg and 
Holmberg 2014; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Kim 2009) which increases the chances of political 
elites to address the issues in line with citizens’ preferences (Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Spoon 
and Klüver 2014). 
 
Having said that, citizens’ preferences for representation are not necessarily fully aligned with their 
policy preferences at every point in time (Jennings and Wlezien 2015). While representational 
preferences are tied to more fundamental values and thus more stable (Adams 2012; Tavits 2007), 
policy preferences may reflect the urgency responding to current events and ever-changing social 
realities (McCombs 1999). Therefore, even when voter-MP representational preferences are largely 
congruent, they may not agree at the level of policy priorities and under such circumstances voters’ 
satisfaction with democracy tends to decrease (Reher 2015, 2016). It thus seems that even though 
representational congruence is an important precondition for citizens’ satisfaction with political 
representation and democracy at large (Jennings and Wlezien 2015; Jones and Baumgartner 2004; 
Spoon and Klüver 2014), it cannot beat the role of issue agreement. The limited time incumbents 
have in office, the restricted capacity of political systems to process policy demands, and other limited 
resources make it crucial for legislators to be responsive to the saliency of particular interests as they 
are perceived by voters (Bevan and Jennings 2014; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2008). Otherwise, the voter-MP ideological congruence, let alone congruence in 
representational preferences, is not enough to be transformed into a positive evaluation of a 




In this chapter, we have reviewed the existing literature on congruence between voters’ and political 
elites’ preferences for representational roles. When assessing the state of art in any field of study, a 
triple-loop model (see Argyris and Schön 1978) developed for organizational learning is a useful tool. 
In line with each loop, three questions needs to be addressed: (1) Are we doing (in this case 
measuring) things right?, (2) Are we doing (i.e., measuring) the right things, and (3) How do we 
decide what are the right things (measures)? 
 
When applied to the study of congruence in representation, the answer to the first question is probably 
something like not necessarily. While the review of the literature on congruence in citizen-elite 
representational preferences reveals that there is a considerable overlap between the preferred 
representative roles among voters and legislators, especially when the degree of agreement is 
compared to the congruence over some policy issues, such as migration or EU, these findings are 
based on aggregated survey responses. However, the very nature of preference-aggregation process 
directs the focus to prevailing tendencies, leaving more marginal groups and opinions disregarded. 
Recent studies comparing survey responses to register-based indicators show that surveys 
underestimate socioeconomic differences and differences between men and women and natives and 
voters with a migrant background in electoral participation (Dahlgaard et al. 2019; Lahtinen et al. 
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2019). The same observation may well apply to studies of representational preferences, particularly 
as the earlier research has shown that economically-disadvantaged citizens are the ones likely to be 
less committed to the principles of liberal democracy (Ceka and Magalhães 2019) and dissatisfied 
with democracy if their preferences are not reflected by democratic institutions (Han and Chang 
2016). 
 
The second question is equally tough: are we studying meaningful things when focusing on voter-
MP congruence in representational preferences? Our response is yes and no. As such, citizens’ 
expectations of an ideal-type, non-contextualized role for MPs do not provide much information. 
MPs’ own role perceptions are more revealing but in reality practical constraints, like party discipline, 
set limits to the extent to which these can be followed in real-life political processes. On the other 
hand, representative democracy is built on the assumption that elected representatives act on citizens’ 
behalf and are accountable to voters. If the opportunities for voters to communicate their preferences 
directly to MPs are limited, political elites must rely on their instinct or other types of discretion in 
an attempt to accommodate their representational roles to anticipated expectations of voters. The 
success in such a shadow-boxing exercise can often have positive implications for the legitimacy and 
stability of the entire democratic system (Easton 1965; Lipset 1959). Hence, it makes sense for MPs 
to know what type of representation citizens want and for citizens to know what MPs can deliver. 
The level of congruence between these two is important knowledge for those interested in the 
legitimacy of democratic processes since vocal dissidents, no matter how small in number, may be 
crucial for the sustainability of democratic regimes because their disappointment can fuel the 
emergence of and support for anti-establishment forces. In short, studying congruence in 
representational preferences enhances the understanding of representation as an active reciprocal 
exchange instead of static power relations (cf. Castiglione and Warren 2019, p. 34–5). 
 
Finally, how can we decide what type of congruence in what types of representational role is worthy 
of investigation? The strong quantitative tradition in the research of political elites’ and citizens’ 
perception of representation follows a predominantly deductive approach. The concepts of 
representation are mostly theorized by scholars, some models dating back to early days of 
representative democracy. In empirical studies, these are then followed up with large samples of 
survey respondents. An inductive perspective, which would firstly approach citizens or elected 
representatives without a priori expectations and subsequently turn their inputs into theory formation, 
is much less popular among scholars of representation. (However, see Lefébure and Rozenberg 2011). 
As a result, we possess a limited set of empirical material which would unambiguously confirm that 
the scholars’ view of representative roles is consistent with the real demands of citizens or of their 
representatives, even though the same concepts have been repeatedly utilized in this research agenda 
for decades. 
 
These blank spots should stimulate researchers for future work. The research of representational 
congruence constitutes a field of potentially high theoretical and social relevance and therefore 
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